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PRO.BLEMS OF COMMAND AND
A

lecture

delivered

LOGISTICS

by

Vice Admi1'al Oscar C. Badger, U.S. N.
at the Naval War College
on 31 August 1950

Admiral Cooley, students of the College: It is a great

privilege for me. to come here this morning.

I want to asEmre

you that no one appreciates more than I do the contributions to

the national security that have been made and are being made by

this organization.

I was just an ordinary line Naval officer until

I was called into the logistic game in the middle of war-much to
my personal disappointment because I was called in from an ex

tensive sea command-but my resulting experiences certainly in

tensified my interest in and appreciation of the vital importance of

sound logistics. planning and implementation. I am glad that we
in the higher echelons of all our Military Services have finally come
to realize that a knowledge of the principles of logistics is a neces
sary qualification for command of military forces.
World War II really brought that about.

Speaking of the

Navy, we had a fine Supply Corps before World War II.

The of

ficers were men who had a good knowledge of how to get things,
when to get them and how to distribute them.

But the average

line officer had but little interest in such matters.

When World

War II came, the situation was different from World War I in a

manner not generally appreciated but which forced appreciation
by all of the importance of logistics.

World War I was, in many circles, considered an all-out war.

Actually, it was a war with one major theater.

The production

Vice Admiral Badger is Commander Eastern Sea Frontier and has a wealth
of e�rience in command and logistics. He is a graduate of Naval War
College, class of 1939.
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capacity of the United States was fully loaded but was, in gen

eral, adequate to the needs of that war.

But when World War II

came into the picture, there were 11 major theaters. . Inadequacy

of the production of the United States was felt in every high
planning agency in this country.

fort became essential.

Teamwork and unification of ef

We found that, instead of having plenty,

in order to carry out our planned operations (even to a degree of

50 per cent of the desired effort), we had to exercise the greatest

economy during war.

Therefore, my talk this morning will emphasize not only the

need for knowledge in the high command of the principles of logis'

tics but a few facts in regard to the relationship be�ween efficiency

and effectiveness and economy in planning and execution.

I also

want to emphasize the avoidance of certain practices such as uni

lateral and badly considered demands, in order that we may suc

cessfully fight a future world war with which we may well be

confronted.

Before World War II, since logistics had been a fairly sim

ple, one-theater, one-pipe-line business, with a possible feeling of

adequacy of the production capacity of this country, the need for
logistics planners taking a proper place in the sun was not brought
into the foreground..

The imagination and the ideas of the oper

ational and strategic planners were considered paramount and all

that was necessary.

The fellow carrying on supply, production and

distribution existed just to carry out these imaginative and pos

sibly well-considered plans.
ner.

We found that we could not fight World War II in that man

We found that, instead of having supermen who could tell

us what to do without serious reference to logistic!!J, one of the
things of first importance was the consideration of the plan from

the point of view of feasibility-feasibility of support, production,
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shipping, and so on-together with consideration as to the timing
of the execution of the various operations in order that big oper
ations should not unduly overlap. It became evident that ship
ping, for instance, could be used to support more than one oper
ation by staggering deliveries, rather than being overloaded as . the
result of an overlap. It became immediately evident, not only that
the closest coordination between our strategic and logistics plan
ners was required, but that they, in fact, had to have a perfect
unity of thought. Any attempt to carry on a modern war with
out the application of that principle will result in fatal inefficien
cy and inadequacy of support for operations.
Therefore, the first thing that I want to emphasize is that
logistics considerations belong not only in the highest echelons of
military planning during the process of preparation for war, but
may well become the controlling element with relation to feasible
and successful operation.
I have mentioned the word "feasibility." I will use a few
examples because I consider that to be a very important word. The
thought behind it must be present in the minds of every military
commander.
In my opinion, the principal duty of the controlling logistics
agency is to ensure that the operational and strategical plans are
feasible.
There are two kinds of logistics agencies. One is the top
agency, the one that determines or approves operational plans so
far as logistics is concerned. The other type of logistics agency
is the implementing agency, which takes part after the operation
has been approved. Although the former may oftentimes control
the approval of operational plans on a basis of feasibility or iri
feasibility, the latter is always the slave of approved plans and
must implement them in an adequate and timely manner.
RESTRICTED
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As an example of the first or high echelon type of logistics

agency, we will consider the big meetings at Cairo.

At Cairo, a

great many strategic and operational plans were submitted. As you

know, operational planning during the war was decentralized; plans
were submitted to the JCS by the theater commanders.

The op

erational and strategic members of the JCS staff jointly with the

logistic members looked them over from the broad angle of: "Does

this suggested operation in such and· such a theater take a prop

er and advantageous place in the early and successful completion

of the war?"

If, from a strategic and operational viewpoint,· and

the objective viewpoint, there was approval, then it was laid aside

as an approved strategic or operational plan for the Joint and Col!l
bined Chiefs.

I cannot tell you the exact number of such opera

tions that were approved at_ Cairo from this objective viewpoint,
but my guess now would be that there were approximately 28 to

30.

After that consi9-eration was completed, the Joint and Com

bined Chiefs took 36 hours leave and went to Memphis.

Before

l�aving, they turned these approved operations· over to the logis

tics staff at Cairo and said, "Examine these for feasibility and

timing. When we return, let us know what you recommend that
we carry out."

I hope you realize the implication of the importance of logis

tics under those circumstances and the control that the logistics
people exercised in the final decisions of the Joint and Combined
Chiefs;

I will review, briefly, the suggested operations.

these were . not Combined Chiefs' plans.

theaters:

Ming you,

These were from the

Normandy-fourth of May, 26 divisions.

South of France

-10 divisions, simultaneous landing on the same day and hour.

Italy-to proceed at its existing rate.
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about 14 divisions into the Aegean. The supply to Russia of 5.5
million tons over the Caspian route, including the provision of tugs
and barges built in the United States and shipped to the Persian
Gulf and to the Caspian. The landing at Moulmein of about 10
divisions to break the Japanese lines of communication to the Malay
Peninsula and Burma. Incidental· operations on the Malay Penin
sula, including an amphibious landing. The Pacific-to proceed ac
cording to a schedule which I have forgotten, but which included
the Philippines campaign, MacArthur having recommended a land
ing on Mindanao on the first of July. In addition, there were in
numerable smaller plans and OSS activities. Et cetera, et cetera.
This is not complete. It is a rough outline.
When the Joint and Combined Chiefs returned, they found
the following recommendations:
Normandy-okay; but instead of the Fourth of May, the
of
fifth June, because of the need for that time in the supply of cer
tain critical items, the most important of which probably was land
ing craft. South of France-because of the insufficiency of air facil
ities available and because of the logistics consideration of not
wanting to divert air from England to the support of that opera
tion, to delay it 15 days-or 45 days from the original date-instead
of making it simultaneous, and to make the landing in darkness
instead of in full moonlight. , Italy-to proceed. The Aegean
eliminated entirely due to lack of logistics facilities, primarily land
ing craft. Moulmein-after considering the failure of the Indian
steel industry to produce steel plate locally, we had to abandon
Moulmein for the same logistic reasons. MacArthur's landing on
the first of July in Mindanao was to,o close to the fifth of June
landing and, therefore, we could not build them both up simul
taneously with the industrial capacity and shipping available.
MacArthur's plan was delayed to any time after the first of OcRESTRICTED
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tober so that the entire production of the United States could b�

devoted to his support from the 15th of March and all available
shipping, except for the normal support of Europe, could be di
verted in that direction. The Pacific Fleet operations were gen
erally restricted, if I remember correctly, to the 135th meridian
prior to the landing of MacArthur in the Philippines.
I merely mention that as a general outline to show the place
that logistics planners assume during war.
I sometimes read with a great deal of interest about the
troubles we are having in order to maintain an Army, Navy and
Air force in peacetime with 15 billion dollars. Maybe it is difficult.
But, I want to say that the training, planning, and consideration
involved in bringing the essentials into the picture under the peace
time money limitation are not unlike the war requirements. In
war, we. do expend many times more than 15 billion dollars a
year, but we never have enough, and one of the most essential things
to be carried in the mind of the logistician and the military com
mander is the exercise of economy. I have just pointed out to you

that, because of the inadequacy of logistic support, we had to
abandon vitally important strategic objectives during the war. If
we had not exercised the strictest economy and unification of
thought and effort, we would not have been able to carry out suc
cessfully even those objectives designated for accomplishment.

Therefore, I want to impress upon you gentlemen, as one of
the lessons that I have learned, that wastage of material or pro
duction effort due to indifferent planning and consideration or the
unilateral demand of one agency without consideration of the
teamwork necessary between agencies has no place in military
planning. It is a fatal defect.
We had an example of unilateral planning during the war

which might interest you. It brings out another point, that when
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we talk about unification of the Army, Navy and Air Force, that
is the least we can expect. We must go further than that. We
must not forget that during. the war we had to allocate steel, ma
chinery, and engines to the Department of Agriculture and to all
the other supporting civilian agencies that provided us with food
and the other essential requirements not only of the armed but
the civilian forces of the United States. So that unification of effort
of the Armed Services is the minimum requirement. It is expand
ed in time of war, and directly affects military planning by affect
ing the availability of men, materials and facilities.
The Maritime Commission was a separate agency. It had
representative
on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Emory La.pd, a
no
Naval officer and constructor, of high integrity and ability, com

manding the respect of everybody, went to the President and got
the President to sign an Executive order allocating 60 per cent of
all plate steel to the Maritime Commission for the construction of
merchant vessels. Therefore, 40 per cent of the plate steel, which,
of course, was a critical item, had to be· divided· between the Army,
Navy and Air Force, and it was inadequate. It was probably one of
the most critical items during 1942 and 1943. There was a unilateral

decision which was a serious one.

The steel induf/try resisted increasing the production of plate
steel above a million tons a month. Therefore, we· were going to
Cairo,. with 400,000 tons of plate steel, knowing that the war effort
was going to be completely curtailed unless the steel industry
would agree to increase its production or a change was made in the
" percentage of steel plate devoted to the Maritime · Commission ·
and/or the Army, Navy and Air Force. It was brought into unison
by an interesting thing. Since I have gone this far, I will tell you
t�e story.
A proposal was made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff just be
fore we went to Cairo that, in December of that year, the alloca-
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· tion of steel plate would be the same, 60 and 40; in January, it
would be 55 and 45; in February it would be 50-50, and there it
would stay. I happened to be in that picture and was asked by
the Joint Chiefs, "Is 50 per cent of the steel plate enough for the
Maritime Commission?" I said, "No, sir; not 50 per cent of a
million tons. But 50 ·per cent of 1,200,000 tons is adequate and
it will be adequate for the Armed Forces." The attitude (!f the
.
steel industry was affected in the fact that the principal consumer,
the Maritime Commission, was satisfied. Although the Army and
Navy were strongly complaining about the production of steel
plate, the complacent Maritime Commission was getting enough,
was rather silent, was not a party to the effort for increased pro
duction. If we put this new order through over the President's
signature, we were going to have the Maritime Commission also
protesting strongly. We predicted that under these conditions that
before we arrived in Cairo, the steel industry would be under such
pressure that it would agree to increas� the production of steel
plate. The order was signed by the President. We went to Cairo,
and the first dispatch on the t<;>p of the pile that I found on my
deskwas one from the deputy in Washington saying that the steel
industry had agreed to increase the production of plate steel ·to
. 1,200,000 tons in February, in spite of the fact that it was only a
28-day month.
On that basis, we were able to approve, that year, Normandy,
the South of France, and the Philippines. Had that increase not
resulted, certainly the Philippines and probably Normandy would
have had to be reduced below essential requirements or delayed for
a period of a year because even with the increase, there was a
leeway of only 100,000 tons in the Cairo plans in regard to plate
steel.

,,

Therefore, the second thing which I wish to · emphasize is
the danger of a unilateral demand. It applies equally to the use
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of political power, lack of teamwork, and failure to consider the

needs of the other fell ow in the team and how disruptive it can
be to him.

Therefore, it is to be avoided because we do not have . · ·

enough in war; and we must exercise not only economy but tE:am
work so that distribution is in line with the greatest effort of all

concerned.

I will attempt to bring out other important lessons by use of

additional examples because I think they are more instructive than
generalities.

Superfluous or unnecessary demands by any command are

to be avoided.

As an example of this, the British came over with

a

demand in 1943, I think, for 95 repair ships and a 100,000 ton dry

dock. We told them, yes, we would give them the necessary sup
port, although it involved a great deal of critical material, but that

we would have to break it down to See how much they actually needed
in the support of approved operations. Briefly, when we broke it
down, we could not justify more than 15 repair ships and no dry

dock.

There was considerable political pressure. on that.

As a

matter of fact, on that occasion, I was called to the White House
and Mr. Roosevelt said, "You are apparently treating the British
pretty roughly."

"No, sir," I said. "We are giving them all that is

justified to carry out approved operations and to that they

agree."

This was a demand which, in its desire to build up to the possibilities

rather than to the realities, represented the difference between ap

proximately 100 per cent and 15 per cent on extremely critical naval

construction which affected, in its turn, air and other construction.

It illustrates the point that superfluous demands on the part of one

military agency may and probably will diminish unnecessarily the
capabilities of other commanders elsewhere.

I got into trouble with the Air Force on a question involving

faulty planning and thoughtless demands against other programs,·
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which is to be avoided as poisonous to all-out effort.

At one stage

of the war, the Air Force and everybody else, realized the import

ance of the B-29 program. So the Air Force came in and requested
that the B-29's be constructed under over-riding priorities.

Under

that priority, people interested in a program could go into any fac
tory or any production program, take out any tool, any workman,
take over any factory, and divert any material for the construction,
in the case I am referring to, of B-29's.
the B-29's in and of themselves.

It

It

was not a question of

was a case of trying to build

something without a plan. There was an idea that this privilege of
getting these things in this manner without delay would expedite
the construction of the B-29's.

We fellows who had to make the recommendations were

strongly against over-riding priorities, but we said, "If you will sub
mit a plan of requirements, we guarantee- highest priority of all re
quirements, and we believe that under such a plan more B-29's,

rather than fewer, will be produced. Furthermore, such a procedure

will not affect the programs of other type airplanes which are being

utilized and which are, in their particular cases, essential to the
pursuit of this war."

There was quite a fight about that, and it was turned over to

the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

There were some rather disagreeable

words passed at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, but I point again
to the teamwork of those individuals in the Joint Chiefs when it was
"Hap" Arnold himself, after hearing the case, who said, "'You
gentlemen go out of here.

Get your plan.

riding priority for the B-29."

There will be no over

Results proved that the B-29 program proceeded expeditious

ly and did not interfere with the production of other essential
planes.

I mention· that as a reason for not getting too enthusiastic

22
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about the needs presented by one Service over the needs of another
Service, or the demand for one type of ship, plane or whatever it
might be, without due consideration of the effect of overemphasis on

that type on the other types which, in their minor roles, are never
theless essential.
In modern warfarel the relationships between operational or

strategic planning and logistics planning must be one of the utmost
coordination and unity. The high command, and by that term I
mean any command that issues operational orders, must insure that

all orders are logistically feasible, otherwise, such orders are
definitely faulty.

Such high command must not only insure that

the necessary support can be made available but that it

wi,ll be

made available at the designated times by the implementing logis
tics agencies.

The high command in the issuance of any proper

operational order commits himself to this responsibility.

Logistics, onthe scale of a World War, is truly a highly com

plicated subject which involves procedures and operations beyond

the ordinary appreciation. On the other hand, the determination of

feasibility of plans even on a world wide scale, is comparatively sim

ple because certain, essential items are always more difficult to pro

duce in adequate quantity than the others and, therefore, these

items become classified as critical and are the ones that form the
"bottle-necks," so to speak, in the determination of feasibility.

During World War II there were always between 10 and 20

essential items that were always short of the overall demand.

These included shipping, landing craft and engines, steel plate,

electronics, aviation fuel, machine tools and a few others. "If
these particular items were in shorter . supply than all of the
thousands of others on the essential lists but nevertheless were

available in sufficient quantity to support the plan under considera
tion, then the responsible commander could be assured of the over-
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all feasibility of the operation." In simple terms, if a landing craft
engine was a rarer item than a truck engine, the feasibility study
gave consideration to the availability of the former and assumed
that the latter could be supplied in sufficient quantity.
In supporting an operation, there should be no such thing
as 90 per cent supply of essential items, or 95 per cent, or even 99
per cent. It should be 100 per cent or else the operation can be
conducted only at a risk of failure. I have seen, in my experience,
officers inclined to boast about Fleet supply ships being sent into
forward areas with 93 per cent of the supply items on board. They
were surprised when I showed a high degree of dissatisfaction. Ex
perience had shown that the very seven per cent of items that were
missing because they were semi-critical and in short supply in the
home ports would be the very same items which would be in short
supply and most urgently needed by the forces to be supplied.
I recommend that in your consideration of the relationship
between operations and logistics planning and direction you become
accustomed to thinking in simple terms. All that I have said re
garding command, logistics, feasibility, adequacy and so on, is basic
and taken as a matter of routine in our day to day operations of a
single ship. For example, the Captain issues orders to get under
way at such and such a time for such and such a destination. He
has received assurance from his navigator that the distance is
within the cruising range of his ship; otherwise, he must provide
for refueling en route. He receives a report from his Gunnery Of
ficer, his Engineer, his Supply Officer and other heads of depart
ments, that his ammunition, his fuel, his stores and his personnel
are on board, as directed, and sufficient to carry out the operatipn;
otherwise, he must provide for ti� �ly replenishment. Here is a sim
�
ple example of responsibility resting on command with regard to
logistics.

If you will think along these simple lines in the con-
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sideration of more complicated questions, I am sure that you will

ordinarily find that the principles involved are the same.

And before I close, I should like to cali to your attentio:q one
of the most important,

if not the most important principle that is

involved in the command responsibilities of producing plans and
directives that are sound operationally and also feasible of logistics
support.

In my opinion, there can be no action or evaluation on the

part of any supporting logistics agency that will lead to greater

or lesser meticulous care in the support of one part of an approved

strategic or operational plan over another. To grant any discretion
to such a supporting logistics agency regarding the need for sup
port of any phase or part of such a plan is a fatal defect and,

sooner or later, will result in disaster.

All approved operations,

large or small, regardless of geographical location, must be regard
ed as essential components in the over-all effort and the means must
be provided for timely success in each case.

old adage, "For want of a nail,

a shoe was lost."

It goes back to the

If the occasion arises when the logistics supply agencies

find it impossible to render required services · at the designated

times, they should refer such facts to the responsible command

. for his decision and action.

Obviously, such information affects

the determination of feasibility and may require his reconsideration
of his plans and of their timing. On the other hand, if he has de

termined his feasibility properly, such a negative report from a

supporting logistics agency may mean a deferment of other projects

of less urgency in order to provide the means available to go ahead

with the support of his plans.

During the war, such action was repeatedly necessary in all
echelons of command responsibility.
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As an example, the demands of the Cairo decisions required
the increase of landing craft and engine program by about 300%
for about four months.

When the Bureau of Ships was confronted
with this problem they required a very considerable increase in plate

steel allocations and engine manufacturing plants and mechanics.

They reported their additional needs to CNO who, in turn, took the
matter up in the Joint Logistics Staff who, in turn, proposed defer

ments in programs of trucks and other less critical items, and
thereby assured the timely delivery of the required landing craft.

Thus, the final important principle which . I wish to em

phasize, involves the complete subordination of logistics supply and
manufacturing agencies to the meticulous support of approved op
erational plans.

They must be uniformly imbued with a "can do"

spirit and mµst undei: no circumstances exercise any independent
judgment or thought regarding the relative importance of or need

for supporting approved operational plans. We found by repeated

experience during the War that the �xercise of this principle was
essential to over-all timing of large and small approved operations,
wherever they might be located geographically, in order that the
planned effect on the enemy of world wide operations might im
pose on him the maximum diversionary pressure and the maximum
strategic disadvantage. Such considerations properly belong with
the high command and under no circumstances can they be justi
fiably controlled by judgment or actions by any supporting or sub
ordinate agency.
These are the reasons why operational planners and logistics
planners must work together, think together and even "sleep

together," in the attainment of the perfect coordination essential
to the maximum effort. These are the reasons why any oper11,.j;ional
plan before approval must be meticulously examined for feasibility
and approved only after the practicability of full and complete sup-
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port have been determined. This is the reason why the Joint Chiefs
of Staff must maintain sufficient controlling influence over the
priorities of production and industrial and personnel allocations, to
permit the adjustments necessary to maximum military effort; and
.this is the reason why the Chief of Naval Operations must exercise
control over his Logistics Bureaus and Agencies and all Fleet
Commanders over their Service Forces, in order that they can as
sure their subordinate operational commanders an unfailing and
ad equate supply of facilities and support essential to successful
execution and accomplishment of the operations with which they
are charged.

These principles apply in my opinion in peace-time when the
over-all limitations to the attainment of military readiness for war
are expressed in terms of the taxpayer's dollar; as well as in war
time when military accomplishment and intensity is limited by the

industrial capacity of the nation. Neither in peace nor in war will

these limiting factors permit sufficiency for all the things that
we would like to do for the defense and security of our nation. But
because these limitations do exist and do constantly impose on

us the need for expending our effort in the most constructive and
effective manner, our organizations, in peace or in war, must embody

the means and determination to attain the maximum coordination
between logistics and operational planners. Only in this way can our
performances demonstrate that we have "done the best we could
with what we had."
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